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The Continuing Influence of
Kelsen on the General




The article explores the contribution ofthepurity ofKelsen's theory of international law to
the exclusion of ethics and political analysis from the workfield of the international lawyer. It
is argued that Kelsen's own approach is an epistemologically grounded argument against
involvement in the emotional dimension of political relations, which he dismisses as
irrational. This is what justifies professional evasiveness in the face of the continuing
self-assertiveness of the nation-state. Keken is now such a formidable obstacle to the
development of the discipline because the profession lacks his general intellectual culture and
so is unable to question the foundations of his system.
1 Introduction
In this short space it is proposed to suggest a hypothesis concerning what is believed to
be the decisive influence of Kelsen on the subsequent development of the discipline of
international law. His genius has been in the realm of the formal. He has been able to
give style and shape to the desire of the profession to depoliticize the discipline and to
absolve itself from moral and political responsibility with respect to serious analysis of
the actual conduct of states.
This genius is captured by the one-time Oxford master of the theory of international
relations. Hedley Bull. Writing in 1986,' he remarks of Kelsen that the key to his
thought on international law is to be found in passages of his Law and Peace in •
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International Relations.2 To be fair to Kelsen it is thought necessary to quote in full the
argument onto which Bull latches. Kelsen asks what Is the basis of the efficacy of a
social order, the motives for the obedience accorded to it. the secret of power. This, he
says, is sociologically a very significant problem. Whether it can be solved
scientifically is doubtful. 'But it lies outside the field of the question of the nature of
law.' The coercive order which is called law must have a minimum of efficacy for its
norms to be regarded as valid. The assertion 'that back of the legal order is a power
means only that the legal order is by and large efficacious', which is true of every social
order. If one objects that the essential characteristic of law is that the power back of it is
the state, this answer is misleading. The state is nothing but an order, an organised
power, which means an effective order. Bull quotes the following passage of Kelsen:
'As a power, the state is the effectiveness of the legal order, and as an order... it is this
legal order itself.' Kelsen goes on to say 'The state as a power back of law, as sustalner.
creator and source of the law — all these expressions are only verbal doublings of the
law as the object of cognition, those typical doublings towards which our thinking and
our language Incline, such as the Animistic presentations according to which "souls"
Inhabit things.'3
Bull comments directly 'The state as entity exerting power, in disregard of the legal
order, engaged both domestically and internationally in contests for power that take
no account of law, is thus defined out of existence.'4 Bull remarks that Kelsen does set
up International law in opposition to power politics. He presents war as a contest
between the law-breakers and the law-enforcers, but takes no account of the
possibility that the latter will not have might on their side. Says Bull, Kelsen's
'conception of international law as "the force monopoly of the community" makes no
concessions to the fact that force is the monopoly of states and that the international
community is without force . . . Kelsen's only references to power are made In the
course of his discussion of the efficacy of law.' At this point Bull introduces the
passages from Kelsen cited above. He concludes vis-d-vis Kelsen that the pure theory of
law recognizes that law has its own logic, but that legal logic will not help to
understand the place of law in international society. This would require a study of
International political realities.5 This is what Kelsen absolves International lawyers as
lawyers from doing. This is his genius. The profession is now very largely unable to
question the foundations of Kelsen's fierce argumentation, because it lacks his general
intellectual culture and so is unable to challenge the foundations of his system.
Without a return to the wider culture with which Kelsen was perfectly familiar the
profession must continue to be lost In its self-contemplation.
What this short note will attempt to do In the space available will be to explain how
Kelsen himself developed his strange idea about the place of the state as a matter of
what he calls legal logic. Then reference will be made to the rather obvious persistent
criticism which has been made of his ideas. In conclusion, It will be suggested, through
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an illustration from prominent international legal doctrine, just how and why his
style and form continue to have Immense appeal.
2 Kelsen, Law and the State
The Pure Theory of Law is about relieving lawyers of a responsibility for political
analysis. Kelsen says that political demands masquerade as appeals to objective
authority, with respect to so-called absolute values of nation, class or religion.
However, they can only be emotionally held subjective opinions.6 Pure Theory is
therefore legal science, not legal policy; focusing on the law alone, it removes all
foreign elements (7). Nonnatlvity is crucial in Kelsen's system for the exclusion of
facticity. The specifically legal sense of an event rests In the fact that a norm refers to it.
And the norm as a specific meaning is something other than the mental act of
Intending or imagining the norm. There is no concern with legal norms as data of
consciousness (10-14). Pure Theory remains remote from longings for justice, since it
is impossible to answer the question of what justice is. All attempts end in empty
formula such as: 'do good and avoid evil'. For Kelsen, even the Kantian categorical
imperative is without content Justice is a matter of will and action and cannot be
forced into a scientific act of cognition without denaturing a matter by forcing into a
logical scheme an object which is alien to logic. Rational cognition can only see that
conflicts of Interest and Justice as an absolute value is irrational: that is, the absolute
claims of justice lie beyond all experience. In actual experience claims of justice
express themselves in ideology. All ideology has its roots in will, not in cognition,
stemming from interests. Cognition rends the veil that will, through ideology, draws
over things (15-19).
External to the confusion of conflicting human interests Kelsen imposes the concept
of legal imputation. This involves understanding the legal norm as a hypothetical
Judgment that expresses the specific linking of a conditioning material fact with a
conditioned consequence (23). This category of the law has a purely formal character
in that it remains applicable whatever the content of the material facts so linked, and
whatever the type of acts to be understood as law (25). The final stage in this
reasoning is to assert that what makes certain human behaviour illegal is neither
some sort of immanent quality nor some sort of connection to a metalegal norm or
moral value, but solely that this behaviour is set in the reconstructed legal norm as the
condition of a specific consequence, that the positive legal system responds to this
behaviour with a coercive act (26). This empirical approach avoids identifying law in
terms of an intuitive correspondence with an idea of right, which Kelsen takes to be a
return to the exploded metaphysics of natural law or of a divine order (28).
The great appeal of Kelsen's approach, apart from its razor-sharp nihilism, is that it
can be presented as a technique, and thereby offer the allure of professionalism. The
formality of the approach allows its adaptation to any social purpose whatever, as the
H.Kdsen,Jntrixiurtlon to tfePn*kms(^L^T?in^ (19 34. tranAB.L Paulson and S.Paulson, 1992).at
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law is characterized not as an end but as a specific means. The law is a coercive
apparatus having in and of itself no political or ethical value, whose value depends on
ends that transcend the law as a means. The law is indifferent to the connection
between the social technique of a coercive system and a societal state of affairs to be
maintained by way of that technique (31).
Kelsen's attack upon the state has to be seen as an integral and even subordinate
part of his attack upon what he calls the ideology of subjective right Kelsen objects to
any idea that a subject can confer to itself rights before an objective legal order does so,
rights being, in any case, understood as exclusive property rights. The person is, as a
word, anthropomorphic, while for the law it can only mean an expression for the
unity of a bundle of legal obligations and rights. The law does not deal directly with
biologico-psychological concepts but only with particular human acts as obligations
or rights. The physical person is the common point of imputation, the subject who
does or forebears, with or without which a sanction will be applied against it (40-49).
The law merely establishes legal connections between material facts of human
behaviour (52).
Kelsen is interested in the concept of legal system as such. If a plurality of norms can
be traced back to a single norm as the ultimate basis of validity, there is unity (5 5). The
uniqueness of law is that it creates itself, so that it is a legal norm that governs the
process whereby another legal norm Is created (63). In this sense there is a hierarchy
of norms and the unity consists in the chain (64). The Pure Theory relativtzes the
distinction between public and private law, where in practice all that can be said of the
two is that the activity of the legislature is subject to fewer restraints than that of the
courts or of contracting individuals, who are at the bottom of the hierarchy of
norm-delegation (94-95). The supposed distinction between public and private law
still supposes the state as prior to the law which it gives itself (as the private subject
was also supposed to be prior to the objective law). In fact, the state is a word to cover a
coercive legal system which establishes certain organs for creating and applying the
norms of the legal system (99). The state is merely a system of legally particular
functions (101). The so-called elements of the state, state power, state territory and
citizenry, are simply the validity of the state system as such, along with the territorial
and personal spheres of validity of the system (104). However, the international legal
system is insufficiently centralized to be considered a state (100). In this vital
statement Kelsen recognizes the hypothetical character of international law. He
wishes to define what it would mean to say that international law is law.
It is the relation of the state to international law, in Kelsen's theory, that has
attracted the particular subsequent criticism which will be highlighted later in this
short essay. Law has to have a hierarchical structure for Kelsen because he opts for
structures of coercion rather than intrinsic content as the distinguishing mark of law.
This creates serious problems for international lawyers who have been content to
insist that some of the rules of international society are regarded as law. They may not
be enforceable against states but this does not matter as they are usually observed
anyway. Such is not enough for Kelsen's idea of law. Since law's structure has to be
hierarchical, Kelsen has to speak conditionally about international law. If one
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recognizes that it is positive international law that accomplishes the coordination of
legal systems and the reciprocal separation of their spheres of validity, then one must
conceive of international law as a legal system above state legal systems, assuring the
unity of law (71). Yet international law has to legitimize power that is actually
establishing Itself and it then authorizes the coercive system set up by this power, in so
far as it becomes effective. The coercive system directly under international law is to be
regarded, in terms of international law, as a legitimate, binding legal system (61).
Here is a weakness in Kelsen's thought to which his critics (see later in this essay)
will draw attention. Kelsen simply displaces the meta-Juridical power of the state from
constitutional to international law. Since all law rests on a series of norms of
imputation which are backed by sanctions, international law must also have such a
structure. Yet Kelsen recognizes quite openly that the international legal system
allows states to be judges in their own cause on matters of sanction (i.e. as in 1934)
(108-109). While there is no world state the only direction possible, in Kelsen's
opinion, and for which there Is mounting pressure, is Increasing centralization. Legal
technique is then concerned to diagnose measures of progress. For Kelsen the
epistemological requirement that all law be considered one system pushes in the same
direction (111). As a matter of logic two systems can only be unified if one is
subordinate to the other because the basis of its validity is found in the other.
Coordinate systems suppose a third higher order system that governs the creation of
the others, determining an element of the content of a lower level norm by a higher
one. 'Here one speaks of delegation; and the unity comprising the linked higher- and
lower-order systems has the character of a chain of delegation' (113).
Again an anti-subjectivism determines Kelsen's rejection of the possibility, which
exists logically, that one could treat all legal systems and their relations with one
another as subject to one particular legal system. This would suppose the whole world
as centred in a single individual, merely willed or imagined by the T (116). Kelsen
returns, instead, to the principle of effectiveness. When a state has established itself,
International law treats it as legitimate if It Is capable of securing the effectiveness of its
norms. A crucial statement is the following. 'When this principle of effectiveness, this
basic principle of positive international law, is applied to state legal systems, it
amounts to their authorization by international law' (120). International law Invests
the entity with the authority to make law and also determines the spatial and
temporal validity of the legal system (120). Kelsen goes on to claim that international
law guarantees this framework for Individual legal systems by attaching sanctions of
reprisals and war if it is violated (121). The state may then be characterized as an
organ of the international legal community. Here the hypothetical appears to become
actual (categorical) and a contradiction emerges. In what real, i.e. effective, sense can
It be said that states are such organs? For Instance, in Kelsen's view, it is not really
individual states which create law by making treaties. It is the international legal
community which provides a norm, pacta sunt servanda, which treats the state treaty
as a law creating material fact (122-123). The supreme attractiveness of Kelsen's
system is, ironically, at an emotional level for international lawyers. His Pure Theory
of Law appears to eliminate so-called state sovereignty as a nearly insurmountable
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barrier confronting every technical improvement in international law, which means
every effort towards further centralization of the international legal system (124).
This effort is the task the profession wishes to accord to itself, a task happily
understood in Kelsen's terms as a matter of legal technique, since the moral and
political reality of the state is excluded from legal consideration as unscientific.
3 The Critique of Kelsen-style International Law Made by
Hans Morganthau and Raymond Aron
A.
In the inter-war period Morganthau had been a student of international law
publishing various works which occupied themselves closely with international law.
In particular, he published in 1934 a work which considers Kelsen's theory of the
state in international law. In La Realite des Normes en Particulier des Normes du Drott
International— Fondements d'une Theorie des Normes Morganthau makes a criticism of
Kelsen's notion of an international legal constitution. He is concerned to unpack
Kelsen's idea of the efficacy of the norm.
Morganthau accepts that one cannot simply observe and then denounce a
divergence between norm and practice in order to defeat Kelsen's system. Nonethe-
less, it is still necessary to have a method to examine critically whether a normative
system Is effective. The system exists for Kelsen in the 'realm' of the ought. However,
the concept of ought as such is only an idea, existing in the realm of thought7
Morganthau does not accept this nee-Kantian epistemology ofKelsen. The ought can
only have a psychological existence, because the ideal representation which the
subjects of the norm make with respect to the content of the norm is a cause of the
realization by these same subjects of the state of fact prescribed by the norm (30). The
notion of validity must contain the element that once promulgated, it will probably be
Implemented (48^9).
This insistence upon a real dimension to law informs Morganthau's critique of
Kelsen's theory of the hierarchy and dependency of norms. The notion that norms
enjoy validity through a process of delegation must have an empirical dimension
(171). For Morganthau a juridical norm which delegates to another cedes to that
other a part of its own vital strength, while for Kelsen delegation concerns merely an
epistemological criterion (174-175). Yet this controversy touches acutely upon the
question whether it means anything to say that international law delegates to states
the validity of their legal orders. The legal order of the state takes from within the
power of the state itself the reality of its normative order. It is empirically observable
' La Realitf des Normes (1934). at 13. Further page references to this work will be In the text. See further G.
Arangto-Ruiz. The Concept of International Law and the Theory of International Organisation',
appendix to The United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources of International
Law (1979).
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that the state exercises the highest concentration of power that exists over a specific
territory (176-177).
For Morganthau nonnativism must Include a criterion whereby one can identify
whether one legal order can determine the will of another (183). How can
international law penetrate state territory which is, by definition, already subject to
the highest strongest power (214)? Kelsen's theory of law should require that
sanctions are above their objects. It may well be possible to say that the nature of a
sanction, such as blockade or intervention, is determined by a rule of international
law, but the normative determination of the means of realization remains entirely
with particular states. Morganthau states what this should mean:
Dans le cas oti I'fitat realise sur le territolre de l'£tat B des sanctions Internationales dlrectes —
dtant donni le critire de l"£tat — qul possede le plus haut degrd d'efflcaclti emplrlquement
constatable sur un territolre — le drolt International livre en ce cas, en derogation aux
princlpes generaux de l'ordre international qu'il institue, le territolre des habitants de l'foat B,
en tout ou en partie, a 1'action des ressortissants de l'fitat A (225).*
If it might be thought that Morganthau has become outdated he remarks as well
that he would not be impressed by the news that states had acted effectively in concert
under the umbrella of the Council of the League of Nations. Whatever the good will of
such states their actions have still a purely state character (221). Indeed, the same
criticisms of Kelsen are made by Arangio-Ruiz in the context of his reflections on the
United Nations in 1979.9 The continued effective factual existence of the state has
consequences which are crucial for the expectations which might be entertained by
international lawyers about the development of international organization. Inter-
state compacts (treaties) are inherently unable to create an international organiza-
tion. For instance, the Statute of the International Court of Justice is just one more
treaty, I.e. an inter-state compact not designed to alter the system's structure by
ensuring effective delegation to other organs.10 In fact 'functionalism' is rejected by
Arangio-Ruiz as a misleading approach to international organizations generally as
these are not the agents of an international community.11
B.
Raymond Aron has also a special interest for international law because he engages
closely not only with Kelsen but also with Hersch Lauterpacht who insists, as well,
upon the supremacy of international law over the sovereignty of the state in his work
The Function of law in the International Community (1933) (see next section). When
1
 'Where state A executes sanctions on the territory of state B — given the criteria of statehood. Le.
possession of the most effective power over a specific territory — international law Is handing over the
territory of the population of state B, In whole or In part to the action of the inhabitants of state A. in
derogation of the general principles of International order which it has Instituted.'
' Supra note 7.
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Lauterpacht says that peace is a legal postulate, the principle of the unity of a legal
system, Aron agrees with the idea that force cannot be employed except In the service
of law. He compares this postulate with the Pure Theory of Law which also defines the
legal order through the regulation of violence. Aron makes the same objection as
Morganthau, adding more graphically that diplomats and soldiers are not conscious
of themselves as legal executioners of International court Judgments.12 The idea of
effective legal sanction supposes that the individual state is not in a position to oppose
an international police force. The United Nations action in Korea much more
resembles a classical war. Under whatever authority the pro-UN states are acting, the
outcome of the conflict depends on the risks of war and is most likely to be a
compromise which reflects a balance of forces (710-711).
There are practical implications in regarding the state as a fact It can close its
frontiers against others, boycott whom it pleases, destabilize Its neighbours, and so on.
Most of all there is not agreement on the basic point of a constitutional order, the
distribution of territory. The international law on this subject, the rules on the
acquisition of territory, is quite banal, as the concern of the engaged political analyst is
not with empty spaces. The problem to be faced is the attachment of populations to
one state rather than another or the desire of a population to constitute an
independent state. History offers few examples of peaceful disintegration of a national
or Imperial state (712-715).
What is provoking crises in international relations is the continuing dispute about
the legitimacy of states. There is a collapse of the previously self-evident legitimacy of
whatever was an established power, usually a military-based monarchy, in a world
which is now increasingly dominated by nationalism and democracy. In the face of
these real tensions, in Aron's view, the normativist approach to the state is nothing
but a play on words. Kelsen and his disciples will not distinguish a juridical order and a
state order, or they reduce the latter to a larger juridical order. That is, they think the
concept of sovereignty is useless because, according to the Pure Theory, it means only
the validity, within a certain space, of a certain system of norms. A realist approach
appreciates that states are a law unto themselves and do not bow to external authority
(724).
The centre of a responsible political theory of international society has to be concern
with the composition of its basic political entities. For Aron these are a historical
mixture of several elements. As a cultural historical nation an entity will have Its own
hierarchy of values and, however subjective these may be, in a democratic world they
will be held onto and will lead to resistance against patterns of domination which are
historical leftovers (296-299). The frontiers between allegiance based upon historic
tradition and allegiance resting upon participative nationalism remain fluid and
unstable. Yet even If they were resolved, in favour of the latter, states would still
pursue a rivalry of their national cultures, each claiming superiority and a right to
dominate (294-299).
Where does this leave international law? Aron remarks that the concepts of its
11
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multilateral treaty law, such as the right to self-determination of peoples, collective
security, and so on, are very vague and in need of interpretation. These are formulae
which require a mediation between positive law on the one side and ideologies and
philosophies on the other (116), precisely the task which Kelsen wishes to deny the
lawyer. One may speak of the principle pacta sunt servanda, but treaties represent a
balance of forces, they are rarely signed freely and a stable juridical order is not possible
unless all the parties judge it to be equitable (116).
The conclusion is easily drawn that the Pure Theory of Law is a ticket for
professional irresponsibility of the international lawyer in the face of political
difficulties. Kelsen clearly states that ideologies, and in particular economic and
nationalist disagreements, are irrational, the cause of unpleasant emotions, etc. A
scientific approach to law looks to the objectivity of a regime of sanction (coercion-
based) norms. Kelsen himself admits that this leaves international law in a
remarkably problematic situation. It cannot really be argued that he does not face the
weaknesses of international law as an order. However, it seems that the appeal of his
Pure Theory is precisely that he leaves the unpleasant work on emotions to others. To
what extent might it appear that those who seem to follow him today adopt an
approach which can be so harshly categorized?
4 The Reality of the Hypothetical: Or the Triumph of the
International Lawyer's Will to Law
It is perhaps to play rather freely with historical chronology to treat Lauterpacht as a
practical follower of Kelsen, since his already mentioned work came out in 19 3 3. It is
nonetheless the style of Lauterpacht which so clearly transforms the hypothetical
Pure Theory of Law into a categorical Pure Theory. Typical of Lauterpacht's style is
the following: "The completeness of the rule of law... is an a priori assumption of every
system of law, not a prescription of positive law. It is impossible, as a matter of a priori
assumption, to conceive that It is the will of the law that its rule should break down as
a result of the refusal to pronounce upon claims.'13 Lauterpacht says that the function
of law is to maintain the peace, and the refusal of a juridical response Is nothing but a
permission to employ force. The least that one can ask of a judge is that he will forbid
the use of force. Lauterpacht considers that it is a rule of customary international law
that the international judge is entitled to go beyond the rules of customary and treaty
law to general principles of law In order to resolve a dispute. This is implied in the
enumeration of sources of international law in the statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (66) (Article 38's reference to the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations). He interprets this article in the sense that each
community can expect of the judges that they will prohibit violence (66-67). So, for
Lauterpacht, judicial logic will resolve the crises of international society which
preoccupy Morgantb.au and Aron so much. Yet how does Lauterpacht overcome the
" H. lauterpacht The Function of Law In the International Community (1933). at 64. Again, further
references to this work will be given In the text.
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classical doctrine of state sovereignty in legal positivism, which expressed the fact of
state power?
For Lauterpacht classical positivism in International law is a negation of the rule of
law In International relations because such positivism attempts to demonstrate that
each state has consented to each rule, and that there are not rules which are not the
product of the express will of states (67-68, 77). In international law the obligation of
states to submit to judges may be Imperfect, but once a submission is made, one
accepts the principle which imposes on the judges the obligation to render a sentence
In all circumstances (68-69). So the actual presence of an International judiciary will
resolve the anarchy of international society.
How does Lauterpacht place the judiciary within the general system of inter-
national law? The thought of Lauterpacht depends upon Kelsen, although he does not
explicitly acknowledge it. The crucial transition from the hypothetical to the
categorical means the assured triumph of the will of the international lawyer, more
particularly, of the international judge. Lauterpacht wishes to reject the idea of an
international law of coordination which makes the law depend upon consent in
favour of an order which is complete. Such a vision Is one of a law of subordination-
command which ties states even against their will. The problem which is posed in this
case is that international law does not possess a political superior. Thus how can one
have a command without a commander? Here is the kernel of the search for objective
validity. Yet the problem Is that for Lauterpacht the idea which treats law as the
psychological will of a real group Is obsolete. From a juridical perspective, the state is
identical to law and to talk of an opposition between state and law is only a play on
words 'then there is no difficulty in accepting the view that the law may be a
command merely by virtue of its external nature'. Lauterpacht goes so far as to say
that there Is an obligation to accept judicial settlement, since, contrary to an
international legislator, the judge merely applies the existing law, the law already
accepted by states. 'But from the principle that a state is objectively bound by an
obligation once undertaken there follows, with inescapable logic, the juridical
postulate of the obligatory rule of law through the instrumentality of courts'(420).
The Influence of Kelsen — In this search for objective validity — is found also in the
following assertion 'The rule pacta sunt servanda confronts states as an objective
principle Independent of their will' (149). What follows In the argument of
Lauterpacht is very useful in understanding the evolution of the Institutional
approach to International law for which Kelsen can claim the original authorship. Yet
Lauterpacht takes as given what Kelsen merely regarded as logically necessary if one
were to speak scientifically of international law. Lauterpacht distinguishes himself
from Kelsen, and also from Verdross, in saying that it is not important to know
whether this claim for the principle pacta sunt servanda can be juridically verified or
whether It Is a rule of customary law. 'For In each case the rule [pacta sunt servanda] in
its actual operation, confronts the state Independently of its will'(419). Pacta sunt
servanda may provoke confusions and have us still believe ourselves In the presence of
a law of coordinated sovereignties. But, In fact, the dvitas maxima, the 'Super-state of
law1 marks the transition from a law based on sovereign wills to a law of nations
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founded upon the sovereign impersonality of law. For Lauterpacht as for Kelsen, the
organs of the international community are the states, but now the international
tribunals are there to say what they want (421-422). Lauterpacht returns to the
point which Aron has disputed: 'Peace is preeminently a legal postulate. Juridically it
is a metaphor for the postulate of the unity of the legal system. Juridical logic
Inevitably leads to condemnation, as a matter of law, of anarchy and private
force'(438).
5 Conclusion
In this short essay it is only possible to suggest hypotheses about the impact of Kelsen
upon International law thinking. It remains important, In the absence of a magnum
opus of historical research, to avoid categorical statements and conclusions
concerning the exact influence of Kelsen upon subsequent international law doctrine.
However, it appears that the outcome of Kelsen's thought is so well represented by
Lauterpacht and in a way very far indeed from the lucidity of his arch-nihilist
colleague. To take the step from asserting that lawyers can only work, in a nihilist age,
with a totally instrumental view of law — as a formal system of rules effectively
sanctioned — to claiming that international society furnishes such instrumentalist
legal materials, through the activity of an international judiciary, is to fall prey to
sheer intellectual confusion in the face of the continued presence of the brutal factual
power of states. Lauterpacht represents a common belief in the profession that the
international legislature, executive and judiciary are, so to speak, just around the
corner. They would be the marks of what Kelsen means by saying that a state order is
a mere form of words for a juridical order as such. As Hedley Bull has pointed out, this
is a classical form of intellectual denial and escapism. With Lauterpacht's over-
stretched faith in the imminent, because so strongly willed, arrival of the international
judiciary, the logic of international law simply bursts.
